



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Lebanon: Story Behind the Headlines

by William R. Frye

UNITED NATIONS—The full and graphic story of this summer's Middle Eastern crisis is only now beginning to come to light as American and British troops prepare to pull out of Lebanon and Jordan.

The following account, from responsible United Nations sources, is known to be the basis on which UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold has acted. It may startle many Americans who have thought the crisis arose out of a simple grab for power by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic.

The story has its roots in the conviction among Lebanese Muslims that the census of 1932, showing roughly a 50-50 division of the country between Muslims and Christians, is no longer valid. Persuaded that a new census would show Muslims to be in a majority, and hence, according to an agreement between the two groups, entitled to a larger role in the government; they repeatedly demanded that one should be taken without delay.

President Camille Chamoun, a Christian, saw this demand as a threat to the foundations of Lebanese life, and to the safety of the Christian community. Instead of attempting to

reach an understanding with the Opposition, however, he became more and more intransigent.

Personal ambition also played a part. Chamoun maneuvered to have the Lebanese constitution amended so that he could have a second six-year term as president.

The situation last spring was therefore ripe for an explosion. Chamoun's opponents were furious over his bid for a second term. He himself was riding roughshod over all pleas for reconciliation, including those of Dr. Charles Malik, his more rational and self-possessed foreign minister. At this point an anti-Chamoun newspaper editor, Nassib Metni of the leftist daily *Telegraphe*, was assassinated. That was on May 8. By May 11 the country was aflame with riots, looting and burning.

The natural source of arms and ammunition for the rebels, as they took to the hills and barricades, was neighboring Syria, now a part of the UAR. Partly on a straight black-market basis, partly with the connivance of Syrian authorities, arms and ammunition were purchased and smuggled into Lebanon. This was not hard to do, for the rebels soon controlled four-fifths of the border.

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Chamoun then appealed to the United States and Britain for help. Washington and London promised him troops if he reached the point where he could not stay in power without them.

But the United States and Britain did not want to go into Lebanon without first having prepared the psychological ground with world opinion. Chamoun agreed to appeal to the UN Security Council for a UN police force to guard his frontiers—fully expecting, and indeed hoping, that the U.S.S.R. would veto the plan. He could then redeem the Anglo-American promise.

The U.S.S.R. did veto the plan. But Hammarskjold, working closely with Japanese delegate Dr. Koto Matsudaira, devised a substitute—a scheme for a UN observer force. Chamoun did not want an observer team; he wanted American and British troops. But he went along with the Hammarskjold proposal, believing Moscow would veto this, too. When Moscow did not veto it, Chamoun was stuck with a team of international observers who, from his point of view, were worse than useless, because they prevented him from getting the kind of help he wanted. It did not take him long to show the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) it was unwelcome.

This was only half of UNOGIL's difficulty. The other half was the fact—which UNOGIL discovered on arrival—that the Lebanese government controlled only a very small portion of the frontier. As a result, the UN observers had an impossible task on

their hands; they could not get into position to watch for infiltration.

Against these odds UNOGIL set about to try to win the confidence of the rebels and thus get their permission to set itself up on the borders. UNOGIL's first report told what it could see from where it was—which was practically nothing. Nothing, that is, that was wrong. This deflated Chamoun's story of massive infiltration from outside and did not improve relations between Chamoun and UNOGIL.

Role of Iraq

Chamoun now turned to Iraq for help. For this part of the story it is necessary to rely on the word of the new rulers of Iraq. But if what they say is true, two battalions of Iraqi troops were issued live ammunition—an unusual move in Iraq—and ordered into Lebanon to help put down the Muslim rebellion. This was too much for the Iraqi army. Plans for a coup had been in the making for nearly two years. They now were triggered off. When the two battalions passed through Baghdad on July 14, they simply stopped and seized power.

Then in a state of real panic Chamoun called on the United States and Britain to redeem their earlier promise of aid. Not knowing the true meaning or probable effect of the Iraqi revolt, "Washington" and London responded—the United States going into Lebanon and Britain into Jordan, where King Hussein had also called for help.

There was no "plan," as such, to

intervene in Iraq. But if a counter-revolution had developed, such that a few thousand men could have tipped the scales, Washington and London wanted to be in a position to help. Short of this, they wanted to protect Jordan's flank and deter Syrian intervention on behalf of the rebels. Washington and London were not frightened out of Iraq by Soviet threats. They stayed out because there was no counterrevolution and because the rebel leaders proved to be moderate independents, who are by no means necessarily in Nasser's pocket, as was at first asserted in the United States.

The absence of any real need for Anglo-American troops in Iraq made them a military anachronism and a political liability in both Lebanon and Jordan. The problem was how to withdraw them, when they ostensibly had been sent in to protect Lebanon and Jordan from Nasser. There would have to be at least a superficial appearance of stability if face were to be saved.

Nasser, wanting to see the troops leave, was willing to cooperate if his face, too, were saved. Chamoun, his career at an end, gave up. Only Hussein was reluctant to go along; but the British insisted, and he reluctantly agreed. The Arab *détente* at the UN General Assembly in August was the result.

"Hammarskjold" was assigned to give an appearance of substance to the *détente*. He has now completed that task, despite heel dragging in Jordan and problems of pride in

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Good Neighbor Policy Given New Look

There is no doubt that things are looking up for Pan-America. A new era of good feeling is opening north and south of the border, due mainly to a "new look" in United States hemispheric policy.

The turning point seemed to come with the meeting in Washington on September 24-25 of the 21 foreign ministers of the Organization of American States—although considerable soul-searching, gear-shifting, and policy-reviewing preceded this formal diplomatic conference. It is only natural that official communiqués and statements from the participants would hail the gathering as a major success. But when our generally jaundiced press rushes in with praise, including kind words for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, one can be sure there is some substance to the optimism.

This was surprising, for the meeting opened under a Washington man-made cloud. The very day the foreign ministers met, President Eisenhower imposed import quotas on lead and zinc—a body blow to the economies of Bolivia, Mexico and Peru.

In spite of this Mr. Dulles succeeded in persuading his Latin colleagues that in the long run United States policy would bring commodity stabilization agreements on products of this type and that the lead and zinc quotas were only temporary exceptions. The result was that not only did the Latin American foreign ministers sing Mr. Dulles' praises but many of them went on to the UN General Assembly in New York, where they put on a repeat performance. To Mr. Dulles, who has lately been receiving more brickbats than

bouquets for his conduct of American foreign policy, this must have been welcome balm indeed.

What were the actual accomplishments of this conference of OAS foreign ministers? They did not spend their time in recrimination, in rehashing the past and in defending lost causes. Instead they reached agreements—agreements which may not sound dramatic by the standards of Lebanon and Quemoy, but which hold out great promise of better times and closer cooperation. They laid the groundwork for creation of an inter-American bank, to be started largely with United States funds. They made arrangements for negotiation of commodity agreements designed to shore up the economies of countries now dangerously vulnerable to erratic world price fluctuations. They instructed the OAS to create a 21-nation commission to work out the details of "Operation Pan-America," and to remain in session until its work is accomplished.

OAS Conference a Success

This was a good two days' work, with enough credit to go around for all. Special praise, however, should go to the United States for tailoring its policies to the needs of the times. Washington abandoned its opposition to an inter-American bank, and modified its views on commodity agreements, as proved by its participation in a Latin American agreement on coffee.

The experience of Vice President Richard M. Nixon in Latin America and the conclusions he reached from this experience, the visit of Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower to Central America and his proposals, the enlightened

and energetic efforts of C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to give the Good Neighbor policy a new look have all played their part in this refurbishing of United States policy toward our Latin neighbors. And as *The New York Times* observed, there was Mr. Dulles' "magic"—his skill at the conference table—combined with the President's warm welcome to the delegates, to help assure success.

Much credit also should go to Brazil's President Juscelino Kubitschek, who took the initiative at the time of the unhappy Nixon trip to South America to urge a fresh start in hemispheric diplomacy. It was Brazil which first conceived the "Operation Pan-America" program, with an inter-American financial institution at the center, which would have the all-important function of mobilizing capital for development and supervising its use.

It is no secret that Mr. Dulles is still somewhat surprised by the success of this meeting of 21 American foreign ministers. But lest this state of inter-American affairs sound too good to be true, one must point out—without being termed a spoil-sport—a cloud on the hemispheric horizon. For Washington's financial help to our Latin neighbors will backfire disastrously unless, at the same time, the United States is ready, and not begrudgingly, to accept exports from these countries so they can pay for their industrialization. But that is tomorrow's problem. Today the new look of Pan-Americanism is a shining phenomenon in an otherwise murky diplomatic picture.

NEAL STANFORD



Is U.S. China Policy Changing?

The renewal on October 20 of the shelling of Quemoy may once more harden Washington's stand. The offer made by the Chinese Communists to suspend their shelling on October 6, for a week if the United States would stop escorting Nationalist Chinese supply ships to the offshore island was regarded by diplomats in Washington as Peiping's response to a shift in American policy, indicated during the week of September 29. However, comment about this shift by observers at home and abroad was discouraged by statements of officials, notably Vice President Richard M. Nixon, who contended that no change in policy had in fact occurred.

Herter-Dulles Statements

Speculation about prospects for new United States initiatives had been stirred by the remarks on September 29 of Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State, who has made few public appearances since his appointment on February 21, 1957, and by answers Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had given at his September 30 press conference. Mr. Herter said that the offshore islands were not "strategically defensible"—a point stressed by critics of the Administration—and that the Nationalist preoccupation with them was "almost pathological."

Mr. Dulles went much further, expressing views, both about Quemoy and about the future of Chiang Kai-shek, which had been taboo in public discussions since the establishment of the Communist régime on the China mainland. It had been "rather foolish" of Chiang, he said, to put so many of his troops on Quemoy (one-third of his army), and if there were

a cease-fire—even a *de facto* one—the United States would recommend reduction of the Quemoy garrison. A renunciation of force in the Formosa Strait, Mr. Dulles declared, would have to be reciprocal—that is, Chiang might have to renounce military reconquest of the mainland. In any case, the United States had no commitment to help Chiang back to the mainland, and it regarded a reconquest as "highly hypothetical." Moreover, if an internal revolt occurred in China, it was "hypothetical" and "problematical" as to whether Chiang would head the new government that might thus emerge.

Mr. Dulles was then asked a direct question, "Is it fair to say that while United States policy has not changed as of now, there is a possibility of some important changes—provided there is some give on the Chinese Communist side?"—to which the Secretary of State replied, "Yes, I would say so."

When these various statements were interpreted as a major change in Washington's policy, Mr. Nixon, campaigning in California on October 2, attacked the Democrats for weakening on Quemoy and declared that any interpretation of the remarks of President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles as a "weakening of our position" is completely erroneous. And on October 4 the President sharply rebuked critics of the Administration's Far East policy in his reply to a letter from Senator Theodore F. Green, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In spite of what seemed like a series of contradictions it was assumed that, if a *de facto* cease-fire did take place, the United States

would consider a next step toward easing tension in the Formosa Strait which, for several weeks, had threatened to explode into war. The next step, judging by Mr. Dulles' press conference remarks, might take the form of evacuating Chinese Nationalist troops from Quemoy. Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, interpreted Mr. Dulles' statements more broadly to mean that Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu would be "materially reduced" in return for a cease-fire and that the United States would seek the development of Taiwan "as an autonomous, secure and free country." Nor did Mr. Dulles' remarks at his October 14 press conference, which were interpreted by some as a disavowal of any intention to negotiate about the Quemoy forces, actually foreclose further changes.

Would Chiang Agree?

The crucial question is whether Chiang Kai-shek would agree to any arrangement, however limited, which the United States regarded as possible to negotiate with the Peiping government in Warsaw or through other channels. The Chinese Communists take the position that the status both of the offshore islands and of Formosa concerns the Chinese people and should be settled between them and the Nationalists without "foreign interference" by the United States. Peiping's foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, who is also a vice premier, said on October 7 that the Nationalist and Communist Chinese would be able to settle their own affairs if only the United States would stay out of the picture, and that the Chinese peo-

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Can UNESCO Be of Aid in World Crisis?

by Walter H. C. Laves

Dr. Laves, chairman of the department of government at Indiana University, was formerly deputy director-general of UNESCO and is coauthor with Charles A. Thomson of *UNESCO: Purpose, Progress, Prospects* (Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1957).

In the desperate search for a way out of the crisis which has increasingly come to embrace the world since World War II, one available resource has not been utilized to its full potential—the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), whose 10th session of the General Conference will be held in Paris in November.

Although it is not directly involved with the central political and military issues which occupy the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, there are three related areas in which UNESCO, by its nature, is especially well suited to make a contribution.

UNESCO's Role for Peace

The first is the tension between the U.S.S.R. and most of the Western world—a product, in part at least, of the lack of free contact between the Russians and the peoples of other countries. The deliberate isolation of the Russian people has been a device used by Moscow to insure their captivity for Soviet domestic propaganda. There are now signs that the U.S.S.R. is recognizing the importance of more communication with the West and that the United States sees the value of developing people-to-people contacts as background for more effective governmental relations.

UNESCO offers one means of increasing the opportunities for such contacts between heretofore isolated peoples. As a multilateral agency it provides particularly important channels at a time when useful bilateral

programs are still retarded by considerations of national strategic policy. Moreover, UNESCO's concern with education, science and culture provides an almost unlimited opportunity for expanding contacts focused on long-term and fundamental problems of concern to all peoples, Communist and non-Communist alike. A substantial increase in UNESCO programs in this field could speed up the development of communications and stimulate other forms of inter-governmental cooperation.

There is much evidence that a real desire exists in both the Communist and the Western countries to share and to compare knowledge, and that this process can be usefully encouraged. While governments must negotiate warily to achieve agreement on delicate matters of security and peace, they could intensify efforts through UNESCO to increase people-to-people understanding based on more extensive contacts in the professional fields of education, science and culture. This kind of understanding is essential to any lasting arrangement for peace that may some day be negotiated in other forms.

Underdeveloped Lands

The second area is the demand of newly developing countries to improve their lot and to obtain a more respected position in international affairs. This continuing demand is a major undertone in all negotiations involving any of these countries and their relationship to the rest of the world, whether or not negotiations reach the boiling point, as in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

This is an area to which UNESCO also could make a much greater contribution than it does today. The character of the needs of the underdeveloped countries is clear: they want to be treated as equals and to participate fully in world affairs, while at the same time they seek to meet the demands of their people for education, health, rising standards of living and governmental political stability. Among the obstacles to achievement of their goals are inexperience, prejudice, tradition, the vestiges of older and outmoded systems. In addition, however, there are important barriers between the newly developing countries and the advanced nations of the West.

Like the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Labor Organization, each of which has its special contribution to make, respectively, in health, agriculture and labor conditions, UNESCO can help the underdeveloped countries in matters of critical importance to their growth. Its record in providing technical assistance has been good, and through it many of these countries have already achieved considerable benefits. Because UNESCO is international in its administration and can obtain technical help from wherever it is available, its technical assistance programs are free of the stigma of suspected national political control so frequently associated with bilateral programs such as those of the United States. This is particularly true in the "sensitive" field of education. The work of UNESCO could be more effective if it could receive a material

increase in the funds and services of technical assistance it makes available to its member states. If, for example, a settlement is reached in the Middle East including a UN peace force and a regional economic and social program under UN auspices, UNESCO could be used to furnish the urgently needed educational and scientific assistance.

Interpreting Peoples

UNESCO's contribution to the newly developing countries, it should be added, is not limited to technical assistance. It serves them also by providing means of interpreting peoples of different cultures to each other through translations of the classical literature of each culture, reproductions of works of art, and so on. Most important, perhaps, UNESCO programs offer the non-Western countries opportunities to display their impressive earlier development in education and in the arts and philosophy which took place long before industrialization became the principal criterion of international power and prestige.

The new so-called East-West project of UNESCO could be a major influence in increasing mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia and the West if it had fuller support from member states. Such support should reflect a determination to close, in a comparatively short time, the historic gap in knowledge and contacts which hampers the conduct of all relations between the non-Western and Western worlds.

The third area with which UNESCO is concerned is the lack of understanding by citizens of contemporary world relations and of the requisites for constructive foreign policies. Through UNESCO member states could make far more determined efforts to help citizens achieve such understanding, so that

they can support and encourage governments in foreign policies which are conducive to the achievement of peace within the world community. Throughout the world there is a serious lag in the development of citizen knowledge of world affairs behind the changes in world economic, social, political and military relations. Provincialism and extreme nationalism remain obstacles to national foreign policies which could meet the problems produced by major technological, economic, social and political changes.

Citizen Understanding

UNESCO is in a position to foster cooperative efforts designed to overcome this lack of understanding. Its pioneer work in stimulating joint comparative examinations of national textbooks and in the study of the treatment of Eastern and Western history in the textbooks of the West and of Asia, respectively; its seminars on teaching of geography, history, languages, economics, political science; its exchange-of-persons programs to increase direct opportunities to study in foreign countries—all these provide useful examples for future undertakings.

Few member states, however, have made serious efforts to develop National Commissions for UNESCO in the manner provided for in UNESCO's constitution to carry out its programs. In the United States, for example, there has been a curious ambivalence in the position of the United States National Commission and its activities. Actually it was intended that the commission should not only give advice to the government on policy toward UNESCO, but should also carry on positive American programs to advance the objectives set forth in UNESCO's constitution and in its programs. Unfortunately, there has been little effort

thus far to relate UNESCO to top-level planning of foreign policy or to domestic governmental policies concerned with the development of education, science or culture. Serious official efforts to encourage citizen understanding of the concepts for which UNESCO stands have been at a minimum. In general, governments have not given much attention to UNESCO affairs.

A Multitude of Difficulties

The idea that UNESCO could make such major contributions in the critically tense field of world politics may come as a surprise to many people. The organization has had enthusiastic support in theory and in practice from leaders of science, education and culture in many countries, but it has not received a good press and it has been under attack in the United States and some other countries.

The reasons for this bad press and for criticisms by reasonable and otherwise well-informed people are not hard to find. Governments from the start were fuzzy in their thinking, and were certainly not in agreement, about UNESCO's purpose. This was in part due to the difference in needs, outlook and development of member states in different parts of the world. Some governments sought help in combating illiteracy; others wanted UNESCO assistance in developing agencies for nuclear research; still others wanted the primary focus of the organization placed on cultural exchanges in the arts. Lack of clarity, however, was also due to conflicts within countries and especially among professional educators, scientists and specialists in the fine arts and in mass communications, or between all of these professional interests and often unimaginative government officials, who failed to understand the potential importance of UNESCO in the UN system. There

has been a continuing struggle between those who wanted UNESCO to make direct contributions to peace and those who sought only longer-range programs of cross-cultural co-operation in education, science and culture.

Some saw UNESCO as an instrument of people-to-people diplomacy, free from influence by governments. Because of governmental indecision or neglect delegations to UNESCO's General Conference, which meets every two years to determine policies and programs, have often been hastily appointed and poorly briefed.

Like all public agencies, UNESCO has had its organizational troubles, involving friction among the representatives to the General Conference, the Executive Board and the director-general. UNESCO has been starved financially by member states, who often talk at the General Conference about the virtues of science, education and culture, but refuse to provide adequate means by which much greater success through UNESCO efforts could be achieved.

Variety of Achievements

In spite of these great difficulties, for which governments are primarily responsible, UNESCO has become firmly established during the period 1946-58 as a permanent international agency within the broad structure of the UN system and has performed important functions.

UNESCO has been able substantially to increase international communication among scholars and specialists in the natural and social sciences, in the field of education and in the arts and humanities in general. This has been done by assisting in the development of nongovernmental international organizations like the International Council of Scientific Unions, the International Political Science Association, the International

Council of Philosophic and Humanistic Societies; by creating clearing-house facilities at UNESCO's headquarters; by issuing publications; and by arranging conferences and meetings among specialists. Through these various efforts UNESCO has helped to develop a strong community spirit and a sense of common purpose among these professional groups in member states.

Work on Illiteracy

UNESCO has also served to focus world-wide attention on a number of significant problems affecting the general welfare, all of which require international resources for their solution. For example, it is UNESCO's preoccupation with the problem of illiteracy which has primarily stimulated large numbers of national and international programs. Most of these are directly related to economic development activities of major proportions. The lack of international facilities for nuclear study in Europe led UNESCO to stimulate the creation in 1953 of the European Organization for Nuclear Research now located in Geneva. Financial and other support has been given by UNESCO to research projects in arid and tropical zones, and on oceanography. Together with the government of India UNESCO established in Calcutta in 1956 the Research Center on the Social Implications of Industrialization in Southern Asia. The initiative of UNESCO also led to the successful adoption in 1952 of the first Universal Copyright Convention.

UNESCO has contributed to international understanding by bringing people together in an exchange of knowledge and in the experience of cooperation on common educational, scientific and cultural problems. More specifically, it has attempted a wider dissemination of knowledge about national, cultural, scientific and edu-

cational developments of individual countries through publications. Some modest efforts have been made to help teachers develop more effective educational programs designed to increase comprehension of the nature of the ever more interdependent world. This has been done through occasional educational seminars authorized by member states.

As one looks at the variety and scope of the activities undertaken successfully by UNESCO within the brief period of 12 years, the record is impressive, particularly in view of the deterioration in the climate for international cooperation since UNESCO was created in 1946. Much more use, however, could be made of this organization by member states in their search for mutual understanding on which peace could ultimately be based.

READING SUGGESTIONS: For general and current information on UNESCO activities, the most useful sources are the monthly *UNESCO Courier*, a periodical for the general reader; the monthly *UNESCO Chronicle*, a journal of more serious character; and the mimeographed fortnightly *UNESCO Features* for the press and radio stations throughout the world. Also of general character is a series of occasional pamphlets, issued under the title *UNESCO and Its Program*. The only summary and critique of UNESCO work to date is the volume by Laves and Thomson cited above. UNESCO issues many specialized publications in education, science and cultural activities. UNESCO publications can be obtained from UNESCO Publications Center, 801 Third Avenue, New York 22, N.Y. Publications of the United States National Commission for UNESCO can be obtained from the Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

In *Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity* (New York, Harper, 1957, Vol. 16, *World Perspectives*, \$3.00), the distinguished Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, argues that under existing circumstances the rich nations are growing richer and the poorer ones are growing poorer, and outlines methods to correct this dangerous inequality.

A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy. (New York, Harper, 1957, \$2.75), by Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, already widely discussed, deserves further study, as the United States rethinks its trade and aid policies.

Frye

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Cairo and Damascus. The American and British troops are now ready to go—if Russia does not succeed in upsetting the precarious applecart.

Mr. Frye, a member of the staff of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1941, has been its United Nations correspondent for eight years. He is the author of *A United Nations Peace Force* (New York, Oceana Publications for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957).

Spotlight

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ple "will never allow the United States to misrepresent one China as two Chinas and distort China's internal matter into an international dispute." In an interview given to the Tass News Agency on October 5, Nikita S. Khrushchev said that the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists is a civil war, and that the U.S.S.R. did not intend to become involved in this civil war unless the United States attacked Communist China.

It thus appears that Moscow and Peiping have as their objective the separation of the Nationalists from the United States and contemplate two different sets of negotiations—between Communist China and the United States, and between Peiping and Taipei. The Nationalists, however, as Madame Chiang Kai-shek made clear in her "Meet the Press"

appearance on September 21, regard the Communists as "bandits" and have no intention either of negotiating with Peiping; nor would they regard the results of the Warsaw talks as necessarily binding on them.

Under these circumstances, is it possible to expect a negotiated settlement of the Quemoy crisis, or must we expect, after a brief cease-fire, the renewal of military operations which could lead to all-out war?

Experts on China outside official circles believe that the Communists are not bluffing—that they are in earnest about their desire to obtain the offshore islands, which they (and many observers outside the United States) regard as appendages of mainland China. Mr. Dulles has accused Peiping of aggression, and on October 7 warned that a resumption of its bombardment of Quemoy would bring "world-wide condemnation" on the Communists. However, if aggression is to be checked now or averted in the future, should an opportunity for peaceful settlement be offered as an alternative?

Hitherto, the United States has blocked formal direct negotiations (as distinguished from the informal talks in Warsaw) by its refusal to recognize the Peiping government; and constructive discussion of the Quemoy crisis in the United Nations has been made difficult by the non-admission of Peiping. Yet Mr. Dulles

himself has recognized the need to provide methods of peaceful change as an alternative to war in his book, *War or Peace* (1957 edition).

The United States could, of course, as pointed out by James Reston in *The New York Times* of October 8, do nothing at all during the cease-fire period, and hope for the best. But complete inaction would arouse the criticism of our allies, who have been careful not to express their views publicly while the shelling of Quemoy was going on, but can now be expected to press for some kind of settlement. Inaction would also make more difficult the task of the UN, should Washington have to invoke its services as a last resort.

It is unfortunate for all concerned that the grave issue of United States policy toward Peiping should have arisen during an election. Some criticisms of the government have undoubtedly had a political motivation, and this may have encouraged the Administration to accuse its critics, implicitly or explicitly, of lack of patriotism or softness toward communism. The important thing is that the lid on discussion of China policy has been taken off for the first time since 1950. All those who believe in the democratic process welcome the airing of diverse views, whatever may be the outcome of the discussion.

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